Wallet safety & backups

Multisig Setup Planner (m-of-n)

A multisig wallet needs m signatures out of n keys to spend. That one number pair decides two risks pulling in opposite directions: losing too many keys locks the coins forever, and an attacker who gets m keys takes them. Enter m, n and your rough odds of losing or leaking a single key over ten years, and the planner shows both probabilities next to the common setups.

Fire, a forgotten PIN, a device thrown away, a key holder who disappears.

Malware, a burglary, a coerced holder, a leaked backup.

Keys you can lose
1
Keys an attacker needs
2
P(funds locked forever)
2.8%
P(funds stolen)
0.725%

Common setups at the same per-key odds

SetupKeys you can loseKeys an attacker needsP(funds locked forever)P(funds stolen)
1-of-10110%5%
2-of-20219%0.25%
2-of-3122.8%0.725%
3-of-5230.856%0.1158%
4-of-7340.2728%0.0194%

1-of-1 is an ordinary single-key wallet: one loss locks the funds, one theft drains them. 2-of-2 doubles the theft protection but makes the loss risk worse than a single key: either key lost means the coins are stuck.

The model treats keys as independent. In practice they are not: two keys in the same house share one fire, two hardware wallets from one supplier share one supply chain. Spread keys across places, people and vendors, and back up the wallet descriptor (xpubs + script), without which an m-of-n wallet cannot be rebuilt even with all keys.

The two numbers that matter

With m-of-n you can lose n โˆ’ m keys and still spend, and an attacker must obtain m keys. A single-key wallet (1-of-1) has zero tolerance both ways. 2-of-2 doubles the attacker's work but makes loss worse: either key gone and the funds are stuck. 2-of-3 is the popular middle: one key can be lost, one can be stolen, and you still control the coins โ€” as long as you notice and move funds before a second key goes.

The probabilities come from the binomial distribution: with an independent chance p of losing each key, the wallet is locked when more than n โˆ’ m keys are lost; with a chance t of compromise per key, it is drained when at least m keys leak. The model's weak point is independence โ€” read the next section before trusting small numbers.

P(locked) = ฮฃ_{k=nโˆ’m+1..n} C(n,k)ยทp^kยท(1โˆ’p)^(nโˆ’k) P(stolen) = ฮฃ_{k=m..n} C(n,k)ยทt^kยท(1โˆ’t)^(nโˆ’k)

Making the keys really independent

  • Different places: keys in one home share one fire, one burglary and one search.
  • Different vendors: two hardware wallets from different manufacturers do not share a firmware bug or supply-chain attack.
  • Different people or roles in a family or company setup, so no single person can be pressured into signing alone.
  • A backup of the wallet descriptor (the xpubs, derivation paths and script type) with every key, or at least in several places. Without it, rebuilding an m-of-n wallet is hard even with all the seeds.

When multisig is worth the effort

Multisig adds steps to every spend and needs wallet software that supports it โ€” Sparrow, Electrum, Nunchuk, Specter and others for Bitcoin; Safe for Ethereum and EVM chains. It pays off for long-term savings, shared treasuries and inheritance plans where a single seed phrase would be a single point of failure. For everyday amounts, one well-backed-up hardware wallet is simpler and the risk of mistakes is lower.

Exchanges and swap services such as KOT.CASH pay out to a normal address of your wallet; for a Bitcoin multisig that address is generated by your multisig software and works like any other P2WSH or P2TR address.

Frequently asked questions

+Is 2-of-3 better than one hardware wallet?

For large savings, usually yes: it survives the loss of one key and the theft of one key. The cost is complexity โ€” you must back up three keys and the wallet descriptor correctly.

+What are realistic loss and theft odds?

Nobody knows exactly; the inputs are for comparing setups. Try pessimistic values such as 10โ€“20% loss and 5โ€“10% compromise per key over ten years and see how each setup behaves.

+Can I use multisig for USDT?

On EVM chains a smart-contract wallet such as Safe implements m-of-n for any token. TRON has native multi-signature permissions. The planning logic is the same.

+Does the planner touch my keys?

No. It only does arithmetic on the numbers you type. Never enter seed phrases or private keys into any website.

+What happens if one co-signer dies?

In 2-of-3 the remaining two keys can still spend. That is why multisig is popular in inheritance plans โ€” combine it with clear instructions for heirs.

Calculations run entirely in your browser; nothing you type is sent to KOT.CASH. Results are estimates for information only and are not financial, tax or legal advice.

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